A. Wayne Winegar and Mary Winegar v. Froerer Corp., P.F. Investments, Fredrick Froerer III, Zane Froerer, and Phyllis Froerer : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
A. Wayne Winegar and Mary Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., P.F. Investments, Fredrick Froerer III, Zane
Froerer, and Phyllis Froerer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Olsen, Paul M. Simmons; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong, and Hanson; Attorneys for
Appellants.
Joseph S. Knowlton; Attorney for Respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








U i m i o u t i». _ 
BRIEF 
muto 





IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. WAYNE WINEGAR and 
MARY WINEGAR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation; 
P.F. INVESTMENTS, a Utah limited 
partnership; FREDRICK FROERER, III; 
ZANE FROERER; and PHYLLIS FROERER, 
individuals; 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 890160 
CATEGORY NO. 14b 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA PRESIDING 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-3191 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. #2458 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. #4668 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. WAYNE WINEGAR and 
MARY WINEGAR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation; 
P.F. INVESTMENTS, a Utah limited 
partnership; FREDRICK FROERER, III; 
ZANE FROERER; and PHYLLIS FROERER, 
individuals; 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 890160 
CATEGORY NO. 14b 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA PRESIDING 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-3191 
Esq. #2458 
Esq. #4668 
DAVID R. OLSEN, 
PAUL M. SIMMONS 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSO 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-148C 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities m 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING LAW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case • 3 
B* Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
in the Court Below 3 
C* Statement of Facts * 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT • 7 
ARGUMENT 10 
X. The Plaintiffs Were Only Entitled to Summary 
Judgment if There Were No Genuine Issues of 
Material Fact and the Undisputed Facts Showed 
That the Plaintiffs Were Entitled to a Judgment 
as a Matter of Law 10 
II. The Defendants Cannot Be Liable for Breach of 
Contract Because They Were Not a Party to the 
Contract, and They Did Not Assume Ranch Liqui-
dators' Liabilities Under the Contract 11 
III. If the Assignment Was Ambiguous, Extrinsic 
Evidence Was Admissible to Show the Parties7 
Intent, and the Extrinsic Evidence Before the 
Court Showed That Froerer Corp. Did Not Intend to 
Assume Ranch Liquidators' Obligations 17 
IV. Froerer Corp. Did Not Buy the Property From Ranch 
Liquidators and Therefore Had No Obligation to 
Convey the Property to the Plaintiffs 18 
i -
V. The Plaintiffs' Recorded of a Quitclaim Deed 
Raised a Genuine Issue of Fact as to Whether the 
Plaintiffs Had Waived Any Claim Against the 
Defendants, Precluding Summary Judgment 23 
VI. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Plaintiffs 
Rescission Because All of the Parties to the 
Contract Were Not Before the Court and Those 
Before the Court Could Not Be Returned to Their 
Status Quo . 2 4 
VII. Even If the Trial Court Were Otherwise Correct in 
Granting Summary Judgment, It Erred in Granting 
Judgment to the Plaintiffs For the Full Amount of 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
American Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 2.89, 
445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968) 23 
Anderson v. Southwest Savs. & Loan Ass'n., 117 Ariz. 1042, 
571 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) 13 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987) 17 
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398 
(Utah 1986) 10 
Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). . . 23 
Big Butte Ranch. Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 
(Utah 1977) 18 
Bonardi v. Caron (In re Auburn Medical Realty), 
19 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) 2 4 
Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) 11, 16, 21, 24 
Briqqs v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985) 25 
B-T Ltd. v. Blakeman. 705 P.2d 307, 312 (Wyo. 1985) 20 
Burt v. Burt. 116 Utah 188, 209 P.2d 217, 220 (1949) 20 
Bvbee v. Stewart. 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122-23 (1948) . 19 
John Call Eng'q, Inc. v. Manti Citv Corn. . 743 P.2d 1205, 
1207 (Utah 1987) 17 
Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, Inc.. 682 P.2d 723, 725 (Mont. 1984). . 12 
Encrlestein v. Mintz. 345 111. 48, 61, 177 N.E. 746, 752 
(1931)
 1 4 
Farr v. Link. 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987) 17 
Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (1960). . 20 
- iii -
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984) 20 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) 10 
Klundt v. Carothers, 96 Idaho 782, 
537 P.2d 62, 65 (1975) 13, 14 
Lomavaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976) 24 
McEnroe v. Morgan. 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595, 598 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984) 26 
McGraw v. Ayling fin re Bell & Beckwith), 
54 Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) 27 
Mark Steel Cora, v. Eimco Corp., 548 P.2d 892, 894 
(Utah 1976) 15 
Murr v. Selag Corn., 113 Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 1302, 1309 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1987) 12, 14, 15 
Qberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977), . . . . 17 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath. 90 Utah 187, 194, 
61 P.2d 308, 312 (1936) 23 
S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 
146 S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966) 13 
S.T. McKnight Co. y. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
120 F.2d 310, 320 (8th Cir. 1941) 13, 14 
Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). . .11, 22 
Utah State University of Agriculture & Applied Science v. 
Sutro & Co. . 646 P.2d 715, 720 n.14 (Utah 1982) 11 
Whitelev v. De Vries. 116 Utah 165, 
209 P.2d 206, 207 (1949) 19, 20 
Whitelev v. O'Dell, 219 Kan. 314, 
548 P.2d 798, 802 (1976) 26-27 
Wohlschlegel v. Uhlmann-Kihei. Inc.. 662 P.2d 505, 514 
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1983) 12 
- iv -
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 
116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 10 
Court Rules 
Judicial Council Rule of Judicial Administration 4-504. . . . 3 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 2, 10 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1989) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-8 - - 19 
Other Authorities 
83 C.J.S. Subject at 555
 # 13 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3 1 
- v -
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. WAYNE WINEGAR and ] 
MARY WINEGAR, his wife, ] 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ] 
vs. 1 
FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation; 
P.F. INVESTMENTS, a Utah limited 
partnership; FREDRICK FROERER, III; 
ZANE FROERER; and PHYLLIS FROERER, 
individuals; 
Defendants-Appellants. 
1 BRIEF OF 





STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered on 
February 3, 1989, and from the Order Denying Motion to Amend Judg-
ment and Relief from Judgment entered on March 20, 1989. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the Utah 
Constitution, article VIII, section 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-
2(3) (j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the assignment from Ranch Liquidators to Froerer 
Corp. constitute, as a matter of law, an assumption by Froerer 
Corp. of Ranch Liquidators' obligations and liabilities under Ranch 
Liquidators' purchase agreement with the plaintiffs? 
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2. If the assignment was ambiguous, did the trial court 
err in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs where the only 
evidence of the parties7 intent showed that Froerer Corp- did not 
intend to assume Ranch Liquidators' obligations and liabilities? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding, as a matter 
of law and without considering evidence of the parties' intent, that 
there was an unconditional delivery of the warranty deed to Froerar 
Corp., which transferred fee title to Froerer Corp-, as opposed 
to a conditional delivery as security for Froerer Corp.'s right 
to receive future payments under the Purchase Agreement? 
4^ Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
for the plaintiffs where the plaintiffs' recording of a quitclaim 
deed raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiffs 
had waived any claim against the defendants? 
5. Did the trial court err in granting rescission where 
a party to the contract was not before the court and the defendants 
could not be returned to their status quo ante? 
6. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
against the defendants for the full amount of the plaintiffs' claim? 
CONTROLLING LAW 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is determinative of the 
second, third and fourth issues presented by this appeal- The 
rule is set out verbatim in the Addendum-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* Nature of the Case. 
The plaintiffs brought this action alleging that they 
had been damaged by the defendants' negligence and that the defen-
dants had breached a purchase agreement between the plaintiffs and 
Ranch Liquidators of Utah, Inc., which the plaintiffs alleged had 
been assigned to the defendants. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below, 
The plaintiffs filed this action in August 1987. After 
amending their Complaint, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. 
After a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was not 
recorded, the court entered a minute ruling granting the plain-
tiffs7 motion as prayed. Record at 80. A summary judgment was 
entered on February 3, 1989, Record at 86, without the defendants 
having an opportunity to object thereto as required by rule 4-504 
of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration. On 
February 21, 1989, the defendants filed a Motion to Amend Judgment 
and Relief from Judgment,1 which the Court denied on March 20, 
1989. Record at 93-94, 105. The defendants filed a timely notice 
of appeal on April 17, 1989. Record at 106-07. 
1
 The motion objected to the judgment on the grounds that 
it had been entered in violation of rule 4-504, it inadequately 
reflected the relief granted, it was unsupported by the evidence 
and it was contrary to law and based on an error of law. The motion 
incorporated the defendants' objections to the proposed form of 
judgment, which was previously filed. See Record at 93-94, 88-89. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On July 28, 1979, the plaintiffs, A. Wayne and Mary 
Winegar, entered into an Option Agreement and Agreement for Sale 
of Real Estate ("Purchase Agreement") with Ranch Liquidators of 
Utah, Inc. ("Ranch Liquidators"), to buy certain property in 
Duchesne County, Utah (the "Property"). Record at 38 1 1 & 42-
43. 
2. The Purchase Agreement required Ranch Liquidators 
to deliver to the Winegars a warranty deed conveying clear title 
to the Property upon the Winegars7 payment in full of the purchase 
price. Record at 43 if 1. 
3. The Purchase Agreement further provided for a down 
payment by the Winegars of $3,480 (which was paid to Ranch Liqui-
dators) and monthly payments of $141.50 beginning August 20, 1979, 
until paid in full. See Record at 42. 
4. In June 1980, defendant Froerer Corp. bought from 
Ranch Liquidators its right to receive future payments under the 
Purchase Agreement. Record at 74 if 2; Deposition of Frederick 
Froerer III (hereinafter "Froerer Depo.") at 7, 30, 37. This sale 
was evidenced by an Assignment of Contract and Escrow dated June 
11, 1980, and signed only by Ranch Liquidators (the "Assignment"). 
Record at 44. 
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5. In acquiring Ranch Liquidators7 rights to future 
payments under the Purchase Agreement, Froerer Corp, did not assume 
Ranch Liquidators' liabilities. Record at 44 & 74 «ff 2-4. 
6. To secure Froerer Corp.'s right to future payments 
under the Purchase Agreement, Ranch Liquidators gave Froerer Corp. 
a warranty deed covering the Property, which was to become effective 
upon the plaintiffs' default under the Purchase Agreement. Froerer 
Depo. at 25-2 6, 28. The plaintiffs never defaulted on their obli-
gations under the Purchase Agreement, and the warranty deed was 
not recorded until June 15, 1984, after this dispute arose and at 
the request of plaintiff A. Wayne Winegar. Froerer Depo. at 6, 24-
25; Record at 45. 
7. In about June 1980, Froerer Corp. notified the 
plaintiffs of the Assignment, and the plaintiffs began making pay-
ments to Froerer Corp. Record at 3 9 <[«f 4-5. 
8. In March 1982, Ranch Liquidators gave Mecca Enter-
prises a quitclaim deed to the Property, which was recorded 
March 25, 1982. Record at 51. 
9. In May 1984, the plaintiffs completed their payments 
under the Purchase Agreement and asked Froerer Corp. for a warranty 
deed to the Property. Record at 39 f<[ 5-6. 
10. In response to the plaintiffs' request, Froerer 
Corp. notified the plaintiffs that they should seek their warranty 
deed from Ranch Liquidators. Froerer Depo. at 27, However, in a 
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good-faith effort to resolve this dispute, Froerer Corp. gave the 
plaintiffs a quitclaim deed to the Property, which the plaintiffs 
accepted and recorded. Record at 39 f 6 & 46, 
11. In August 1987, the plaintiffs brought this action 
against Froerer Corp. alleging that it had negligently failed to 
record its warranty deed, allowing the Property to be deeded to 
third parties, that it had negligently failed to make payments to 
the fee owner, allowing the Property to be foreclosed, that it 
had been unjustly enriched by the amounts it had received under 
the Purchase Agreement, and that it had breached the Purchase Agree-
ment by failing to provide the plaintiffs with a warranty deed 
and title insurance.2 Record at 2-4. 
12. On December 5, 1988, the plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment, seeking rescission of the Purchase Agreement and a judg-
ment for the amounts they had paid under the Purchase Agreement. 
Record at 38-54. 
13. In response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, the defendants submitted the Affidavit of Fredrick 
Froerer, III, which stated that the Assignment was merely an assign-
ment of the rights to receive payments due under the Purchase Agree-
ment, that Froerer Corp. never agreed to assume Ranch Liquidators' 
2
 The plaintiffs later amended their Complaint to add as 
defendants P.F. Investments and the individual defendants (Fredrick 
Froerer III, Zane Froerer and Phyllis Froerer), whom the plaintiffs 
alleged had succeeded to the assets and liabilities of Froerer 
Corp. See Record at 20 f 1. 
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liabilities under the Purchase Agreement and that Froerer Corp. 
did not intend its acceptance of the Assignment to constitute an 
assumption of Ranch Liquidators7 liabilities. Record at 73-74. 
The plaintiffs did not submit any affidavits disputing Mr. Froerer7s 
testimony but instead relied on the documents appended to their 
briefs. See Record at 42-53 & 67-69. 
14. By a minute entry dated January 31, 1989, the court 
granted the plaintiffs7 motion "as prayed" based on "the rationale 
submitted and argued by the plaintiff" in support of the motion, 
which the court found to be "the more reasonable under the facts 
and . . • more in support of the apparent intent of the parties." 
Record at 80. A summary judgment was subsequently entered. Record 
at 86-87. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs were only entitled to summary judgment 
if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
undisputed facts showed that the plaintiffs were entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. (Point I.) The plaintiffs did not 
meet either requirement. Not only were there genuine factual issues 
as to the intent of the parties to the relevant transactions, but 
also, under the plaintiffs7 legal theories and the undisputed evi-
dence of record, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
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The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment "as prayed," for the reasons "submitted and argued by" the 
plaintiffs in support of their motion. Record at 80. 
The plaintiffs argued two theories in support of their 
motion. First, they argued that Froerer Corp- breached its contract; 
with the plaintiffs by not giving the plaintiffs a warranty deed 
conveying clear title to the Property- Second, the plaintiffs 
argued that Froerer Corp- had bought the Property from Ranch 
Liquidators with notice of the plaintiffs7 equitable interest in 
the Property under the Purchase Agreement and was therefore requirec 
to convey the Property to the plaintiffs when they fully complied 
with the Purchase Agreement- See Record at 40-41 & 81-83. 
The trial court's decision was based solely "on the legal 
effect of the docum[e]nts of contract and conveyance." Record at 
80. The plaintiffs' first theory must fail because the Assignment 
(the document of contract) clearly shows that Froerer Corp- did 
not assume Ranch Liquidators' liabilities under the Purchase Agree-
ment but only took an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' right to 
future payments. (Point II.) If the Assignment was ambiguous, 
parol evidence was admissible to show the parties' intent, and 
the only parol evidence of intent before the court showed that 
Froerer Corp. did not intend to assume Ranch Liquidators' 
liabilities. (Point III.) Thus, Ranch Liquidators remained liable 
under its contract with the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' claim 
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for breach of contract lies against Ranch Liquidators—not these 
defendants• 
The defendant's second theory fails because the undisputed 
evidence showed that Froerer Corp. did not buy the Property from 
Ranch Liquidators but only took a warranty deed to secure its right 
to receive payments under the Purchase Agreement. At the very 
least, the intent of the parties to the warranty deed raised a 
genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. 
(Point IV.) 
The plaintiffs7 acceptance and recording of a quitclaim 
deed from Froerer Corp. also raised an issue of material fact— 
namely, whether the plaintiffs waived any claim they may have had 
against the-defendant—making summary judgment inappropriate. 
(Point V.) 
Not only was summary judgment inappropriate, but also 
the relief the plaintiffs prayed for—rescission of the Purchase 
Agreement and a return of the monies they paid—was not available 
under the facts of this case because a party to the agreement— 
Ranch Liquidators—was not before the court and the defendants 
could not be returned to their status quo ante. (Point VI.) 
Finally, even assuming that the trial court was correct 
in granting summary judgment, it erred in granting the plaintiffs 
summary judgment against the defendants for the full amount the 
plaintiffs paid under the Purchase Agreement because the undisputed 
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facts showed that the defendants did not receive the full amount 
the plaintiffs paid, (Point VII.) 
ARGUMENT 
I, THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ONLY ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IF THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOWED 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As this court well knows, summary judgment is appro-
priate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Ingram 
v, Salt Lake Citv. 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). 
"Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the same 
standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning 
whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are 
not, what legal result obtains." Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 
780 P.2d 821, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In considering a summary judgment, the trial and 
appellate courts must view the facts in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion. See, e.g., Barlow Society 
v. Commercial Security Bankr 723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986); 
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Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 
1979) . Any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact 
must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion, 
and all reasonable inferences that can fairly be drawn from 
the evidence must be evaluated in a light most favorable to 
the opposing party, Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 
43 6 (Utah 1982). Summary judgment should be granted only "when 
it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability 
that the party moved against could prevail." Utah State 
University of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 
646 P.2d 715, 720 n.14 (Utah 1982), 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because, as shown below, there were genuine issues of material 
fact and the plaintiffs were not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
II. THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT A PARTY TO THE 
CONTRACT, AND THEY DID NOT ASSUME RANCH LIQUI-
DATORS7 LIABILITIES UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
The plaintiffs sought, by their motion for summary judg-
ment, to rescind the Purchase Agreement and to receive a return 
of their investment because the defendants had not complied with 
the provision of the agreement requiring them to give the plaintiffs 
a warranty deed and title insurance. See Record at 40-41. The 
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defendants, of course, were not parties to the Purchase Agreement 
and therefore had no obligation to convey clear title to the plain-
tiffs under that agreement unless they assumed such an obligation. 
The plaintiffs argued that Froerer Corp, assumed Ranch Liquidators' 
liabilities under the Purchase Agreement when it took an assignment 
of the agreement„ 
The law is clear that, absent an assumption of liability, 
an assignment of a contract does not impose on the assignee the 
assignor's duties or liabilities under the contract. See, e.g., 
Murr v. Selag CoriD. , 113 Idaho 773, 747 P. 2d 1302, 1309 (Idaho 
Ct« App. 1987); Wohlschleoel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc. 662 P.2d 505, 
514 (Hawaii Ct. App, 1983) • Before an assignee can be subject to 
liability under its assignor's contract, it must be "clearly shown 
that the assignee • . . expressly or impliedly assumed the assig-
nor's liability," Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, Inc. 682 P.2d 723, 725 
(Mont. 1984)• "An assignee's assumption of an assignor's 
liabilities is never presumed, and the burden of proof is upon 
the party who asserts that there has been an assumption" to show 
an assumption by "clear and unequivocal" evidence, Murr, 747 P.2d 
at 1309 (citations omitted). 
Froerer Corp- did not expressly assume Ranch Liquidators' 
liabilities. In fact, it expressly did not assume them. The 
Assignment by its terms only transferred to Froerer Corp, Ranch 
Liquidators' "right, title, interest and equity" in the Purchase 
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Agreement—not Ranch Liquidators' obligations or liabilities-
Record at 44, In other words, it was an assignment of a contract 
receivable, of Ranch Liquidators' right to receive future payments 
under the Purchase Agreement- See Froerer Depo. at 3 0 & 37. 
Moreover, the Assignment further stated that the Purchase Agreement 
"is being held by Ranch Liquidators of Utah, Inc.," showing the 
parties' intent that Ranch Liquidators—not Froerer Corp.—remain 
obligated under the Purchase Agreement. 
Finally, the Assignment stated: "Buyer accepts this 
Assignment subject to the covenants and conditions contained in 
said agreement of sale." Record at 44 (emphasis added). Courts 
have often construed the words "subject to" and have concluded 
that "[t]he words Nsubject to' are not promissory." Klundt v. 
Carothers, 96 Idaho 732, 537 P.2d 62, 65 (1975). "They are words 
of qualification and notice and not words of assumption" or con-
tract. S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. Realty Corp., 206 Va. 
673, 146 S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966). See also S.T. McKniaht Co. v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 120 F.2d 310, 320 (8th Cir. 1941). 
They connote "an absence of personal obligation." S.L. Nusbaum, 
146 S.E.2d at 209 (quoting 33 C.J.S. Subject at 555). "There is 
nothing in the use of the words Nsubject to,' in their ordinary 
use, which would even hint at the creation of affirmative rights." 
Anderson v. Southwest Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 117 Ariz. 1042, 571 P.2d 
1042, 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Enalestein v. Mintz, 
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345 111. 48, 61, 177 N.E. 746, 752 (1931)). The law is clear that 
one who takes an assignment of assets "subject to" a covenant, 
condition or obligation does not thereby assume liability for a 
breach of the covenant, condition or obligation. See, e.g., S.T. 
McKniaht Co., 120 F,2d at 320; Klundt, 537 P.2d at 65-
This case is similar to Murr v. Selag Corporation, 113 
Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 1302 (Idaho Ct. App, 1987). Selag sold certain 
property to the Murrs and received, in partial payment, a $48,000 
note secured by a trust deed. Selag was indebted to SeaFirst. 
To reduce its debt to SeaFirst, Selag transferred all of its assets, 
including the Murrs' note and trust deed, to SeaFirst, subject to 
certain claims. 747 P.2d at 13 04. The Murrs brought an action 
against Selag when they discovered that the property contained 
less acreage than Selag had represented. They later amended their 
complaint to add SeaFirst as a defendant and to seek rescission 
of the contract. The trial court found that the Murrs were entitled 
to rescission and restitution and further found that, by virtue 
of the assignment from Selag to SeaFirst of the Murrs' note and 
trust deed, SeaFirst had assumed any liability Selag had toward 
the Murrs. The court ordered both Selag and SeaFirst to reimburse 
the Murrs for all their payments, taxes and expenses incurred as 
a result of the sale. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed as to SeaFirst. 
The court noted that the assignment, like the Assignment here, 
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did not express any intent by SeaFirst to assume liability for 
the Murrs' claims against Selag. Id. at 1310. The court further 
held: 
The effect given to the words "subject to" is 
that the obligor on the note may assert setoffs 
against it or may have defenses that make the 
note uncollectible, but the obligor cannot 
make affirmative claims for damages against 
the note assignee based upon some tort or breach 
of contract by the original payee. 
£d. at 1309 (citation omitted). The court concluded that, by the 
assignment from Selag, SeaFirst did not assume Selag's liability 
for affirmative claims made by the Murrs.3 
Similarly, the Assignment from Ranch Liquidators to 
Froerer Corp. did not make Froerer Corp. liable for any claim that 
the Winegars may have had against Ranch Liquidators under the Pur-
chase Agreement. The Assignment is clear on its face. It states 
that it is accepted "subject to the covenants and conditions con-
tained in" the Purchase Agreement. The court cannot add to, ignore 
or discard words in a contract but must give them "an objective 
and reasonable construction." Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corr>., 
548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976). The language of the Assignment, 
as a matter of law, limited Froerer Corp.'s liability and showed 
J
 Moreover, the court held that a second agreement, between 
SeaFirst, Selag and the principal owner of Selag, by which the 
parties agreed that SeaFirst "shall be responsible as owners of 
the Murr" claim "for the handling of the matter," did not make 
SeaFirst liable on the Murrs' claim against Selag. 747 P.2d at 
1310-13. 
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its intent not to assume Ranch Liquidators' obligations under the 
Purchase Agreement, 
The conclusion that Froerer Corp* did not assume Ranch 
Liquidators' liabilities is supported not only by the language of 
the Assignment but by inferences drawn from the Assignment itself. 
Under the Purchase Agreement, Ranch Liquidators had the duty to 
convey clear title to the plaintiffs, upon the plaintiffs' payment 
of the purchase price. If the parties to the Assignment had 
intended that Froerer Corp, become liable on that obligation, they 
would have required Froerer Corp. to sign the Assignment, since, 
under Utah's statute of frauds, a "promise to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another" is void unless it (or some 
memorandum of the agreement) is "in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith-" Utah Code Ann- § 25-5-4(2) (1989)- Not 
only was the Assignment not signed by Froerer Corp-, there was 
not even a signature line on the Assignment for Froerer Corp. 
See Record at 44. One could infer from this that the parties to 
the Assignment did not intend Froerer Corp- to answer for Ranch 
Liquidators' default in failing to convey clear title- On a motion 
for summary judgment, the trial court was required to draw that 
inference- See Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982) . 
Because the Assignment did not constitute an assumption 
by Froerer Corp. of Ranch Liquidators' Liabilities, the defendants 
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cannot, as a matter of law, be liable for Ranch Liquidators' failure 
to convey clear title, and the trial court erred in granting the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
III. IF THE ASSIGNMENT WAS AMBIGUOUS, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE PARTIES' INTENT, AND 
THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT SHOWED THAT 
FROERER CORP. DID NOT INTEND TO ASSUME RANCH 
LIQUIDATORS' OBLIGATIONS. 
An assignment is a contract and is interpreted according 
to the rules of contract construction. See, e.g., Farr v. Link, 
746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987). In interpreting a contract, the 
intentions of the parties are controlling. John Call Ena'a, Inc. 
v. Manti City Cora.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If possible, 
those intentions must be found in the written contract itself. 
Atlas Corn, v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); 
Oberhanslv v. Earla. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). 
The trial court apparently recognized and tried to follow 
these principles of contract construction. It held that the plain-
tiffs' interpretation of the relevant documents was "more in support 
of the apparent intent of the parties." However, the fial court 
did not base its decision on any direct, extrinsic evidence of 
the parties' intent but solely on "the legal effect of the 
docum[e]nts of contract and conveyance." Record at 80. As shown 
above, the legal effect of the Assignment was that Froerer Corp. 
did not assume Ranch Liquidators' liabilities but took Ranch 
Liquidators' right to payments under the Purchase Agreement "subject 
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to" those liabilities. Thus, based on the parties' intent, as 
shown by the clear language of the Assignment, the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to summary judgment. 
If, however, the meaning of the Assignment was ambiguous 
or uncertain, then the court was required to determine the parties' 
intentions from evidence other than the contract itself. Big Butte 
Ranch. Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977). The only 
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent that was before the court 
was the Affidavit of Fredrick Froerer, III, which showed that 
Froerer Corp. never intended to assume Ranch Liquidators' liabi-
lities under the Purchase Agreement when it accepted the Assignment 
from Ranch Liquidators. See Record at 73-74. Thus, even if the 
Assignment was unclear or ambiguous, the court would have had to 
reach the same conclusion, namely, that Froerer Corp. did not assume 
Ranch Liquidators' liabilities, and the plaintiffs would still 
not be entitled to summary judgment* 
IV. FROERER CORP. DID NOT BUY THE PROPERTY FROM RANCH 
LIQUIDATORS AND THEREFORE HAD NO OBLIGATION TO 
CONVEY THE PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The plaintiffs' second theory for the defendants' alleged 
liability was that Froerer Corp. bought the Property from Ranch 
Liquidators with knowledge of the plaintiffs' interest in the Prop-
erty under the Purchase Agreement and therefore took the Property 
impressed with a trust in favor of the plaintiffs and were under 
an obligation to complete the Purchase Agreement and convey the 
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Property to the plaintiffs upon their payment of the purchase price. 
See Record at 40-41. The plaintiffs' second argument must fail 
because the undisputed evidence showed that Froerer Corp. did not 
buy the Property but received a warranty deed to the Property only 
as security for its right to receive payments under the Purchase 
Agreement. 
The trial court based its decision on "the legal effect 
of the docum[e]nts of contract and conveyance." Record at 30. 
Apparently, the trial court concluded that, because Ranch Liquida-
tors had given Froerer Corp. a warranty deed to the Property, there 
had been an absolute conveyance of the Property from Ranch Liqui-
dators to Froerer Corp. However, under Utah law, one cannot con-
clude from the existence of a warranty deed alone that there has 
been a conveyance of fee title to property. Thus, the trial court 
erred in concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Under Utah law, a deed, absolute in form, may be given 
to secure a claim or indebtedness. In such a case, the deed is 
construed as a mortgage and not as a conveyance o* title to or an 
estate in .land. Utah Code Ann. § 73-40-8 (1987); Whitelev v. De 
Vries, 116 Utah 165, 209 P.2d 206, 207 (1949); Bvbee v. Stewart. 
112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122-23 (1948). 
Moreover, for a conveyance of real property to be effec-
tive, there must be a delivery of the deed from the grantor to 
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the grantee with the intention of transferring ownership- Givan 
v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (1960). There must 
also be an acceptance on the part of the grantee- B-T Ltd- v. 
Blakeman, 705 P-2d 307, 312 (Wyo. 1985). A deed can be delivered 
conditionally, that is, to take effect only on the happening of a 
certain event- When it is so delivered, it has no immediate effect 
on title to the land- Burt v. Burt, 116 Utah 188, 209 P-2d 217, 
220 (1949) -
Delivery and acceptance of a deed are matters of inten-
tion- B-T Ltd., 705 P.2d at 312. Whether or not there has been 
a delivery with the intent to transfer title and whether or not 
there has been an acceptance by the grantee are questions of fact-
See Horton v. Horton, 695 P-2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984); B-T Ltd., 
705 P.2d at 311-12- Parol evidence was admissible to show that 
the parties intended a mortgage and not an absolute conveyance of 
title to property. Whitelev, 2 09 P.2d at 2 07. 
The only direct evidence of Ranch Liquidators' and Froerer 
Corp-'s intent was the testimony of Fredrick Froerer III. Mr. 
Froerer testified in his deposition that Froerer Corp- bought from, 
Ranch Liquidators certain contract receivables and received from 
Ranch Liquidators deeds to the lots covered by the contracts solely 
to give title to Froerer Corp. in the event of default by the con-
tract purchasers- Froerer Depo- at 26- See also id. at 28, 8. 
In other words, the warranty deeds to Froerer Corp. were only meant 
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as security, to secure Froerer Corp.'s right to receive the contract 
payments. If the contract purchasers did not default on their 
obligations, the deeds would never become effective, and "Froerer 
Corporation would not be entitled or in the chain of title.tf 
Froerer Depo. at 8. This testimony was not disputed. 
In addition to this direct testimony of the parties' 
intent, the trial court could conclude from the circumstantial 
evidence that the parties did not intend the warranty deed as a 
present conveyance of fee title. Froerer Corp. apparently received 
the deed when it took the assignment of Ranch Liquidators' contract 
receivable, see Froerer Depo. at 3, but it never recorded the deed.4 
Yet it did record a Notice of Assignment of Contracts, which covered 
the Assignment of the Purchase Agreement. See Record at 67-63. 
Froerer Corp.'s conduct is perfectly consistent with its position 
that the warranty deed was not meant as a present conveyance of 
fee title but only as security for Froerer Corp.'s right to receive 
contract payments. One could certainly infer as much from the 
recording history of the relevant documents, and the defendants 
were entitled, on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, to 
have the trial court draw that inference. See Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
The deed was eventually recorded at the request of 
plaintiff A. Wayne Winegar. See Record at 45. 
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In short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the defendants, the party opposing the motion, and drawing all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the defendants7 
position, as the trial court was required to do, see id., the court 
would have had to conclude that Ranch Liquidators' delivery to 
Froerer Corp. of a warranty deed was not meant to transfer title 
but was given only to secure Froerer Corp.'s right to receive future 
payments under the Purchase Agreement and that delivery of the 
deed only created a mortgage on the Property and did not transfer 
to Froerer Corp. title to the Property. If that was the case, 
Froerer Corp. had no obligation to convey clear title to the plain-
tiffs upon their payment of the purchase price. That obligation 
remained with Ranch Liquidators, the owner of the Property and 
the seller under the Purchase Agreement. Any claim that the plain-
tiffs had as a result of their failure to receive a warranty deed 
would therefore lie against Ranch Liquidators and not against the 
defendants. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs 
summary judgment because, based on the facts of record evaluated 
in a light most favorable to the defendants, the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Themv v. Seagull 
Enters.. Inc.. 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979). 
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V. THE PLAINTIFFS' RECORDING OF A QUITCLAIM DEED RAISED 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS 
HAD WAIVED ANY CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
After the plaintiffs had made all of the payments required 
by the Purchase Agreement, they asked Froerer Corp. for a warranty 
deed to the Property. Froerer Corp. explained to the plaintiffs 
that they should seek a warranty deed from Ranch Liquidators, the 
party with whom they had contracted for a warranty deed. However, 
in an effort to resolve this dispute and clear any cloud on the 
title that may have been created by Froerer Corp.'s recording of 
its Notice of Assignment of Contracts, Froerer Corp. gave the plain-
tiffs a quitclaim deed to the Property, which the plaintiffs 
accepted and recorded. See Record at 46. The defendants claimed 
that, by accepting and recording this quitclaim deed, the plaintiffs 
waived any claim they may have had against the defendants. 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. American Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomouist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 
445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)« A waiver may be express or implied and may arise 
from acts, words or conduct of the one waiving the right. Phoenix 
Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 312 (1936); 
Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230. A waiver requires an intention on the 
part of the party waiving the right to relinquish the right. 
Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230. Whether or not a right has been waived 
is generally a question of fact. Id. 
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One could infer from the plaintiffs' acceptance and re-
cording of the quitclaim deed that they thereby waived any claims 
they may have had against the defendants. The plaintiffs did not 
submit any evidence negating that inference, and, on a motion for 
summary judgment, the court is required to draw from the evidence 
those inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). At the 
very least, the plaintiffs' intent in accepting and recording the 
quitclaim deed raised a genuine issue of material fact, precludincf 
summary j udgment. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS 
RESCISSION BECAUSE ALL OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT 
WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND THOSE BEFORE THE COURT 
COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR STATUS QUO. 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment sought res-
cission of the Purchase Agreement and a return of their investment* 
See Record at 41. The trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs 
rescission because the other party to the contract—Ranch Liqui-
dators—was not a party to their action, "No procedural principle 
is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action 
to set aside a . . . contract, all parties who may be affected by 
the determination of the action are indispensable.'1 Lomavaktewa 
v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 
425 U.S. 903 (1976). See also Bonardi v. Caron fin re Auburn 
Medical Realty), 19 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (where 
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the rights sued upon arise from a contract, all parties to the 
contract must be joined). A judgment rescinding a contract 
obviously affects the parties to the contract- The only parties 
to the Purchase Agreement were the plaintiffs and Ranch Liquidators. 
The trial court therefore erred in granting the plaintiffs a summary 
judgment rescinding the Purchase Agreement because the other party 
to the agreement was not before the court. 
Moreover, the trial court erred in granting rescission 
because the defendants could not be returned to their status quo 
ante* 
An essential part of rescission of a contract is to 
restore the parties to their status quo prior to their entering 
into the contract. See, e.cr, , Briaas v. Liddell, 699 P. 2d 770, 
773 (Utah 1985). To the extent that the trial court concluded 
that Froerer Corp. had become a party to the Purchase Agreement, 
assuming Ranch Liquidators7 liabilities thereunder, the trial court 
erred in granting rescission because Froerer Corp. could not be 
returned to its position before it became a party to the contract. 
It has lost the money that it paid to Ranch Liquidators to take 
an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' contract receivable. Moreover, 
it has also lost its security for any claim that it may have had 
against Ranch Liquidators for a return of its money. Finally, to 
the extent that the trial court required Froerer Corp. to return 
to the plaintiffs the monies they paid to Ranch Liquidators, the 
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judgment does not put the defendants in their status quo ante but 
in a worse position than they were in before the Assignment. See 
infra pt. VI. For all of these reasons, the trial court erred in 
granting the plaintiffs rescission. 
VII. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT WERE OTHERWISE CORRECT IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF 
THEIR CLAIM. 
Even if the trial court were otherwise correct in con-
cluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment, it 
erred by granting them summary judgment for the entire purchase 
price of the Property and not for the amounts paid to Froerer Corp. 
The evidence was undisputed that the plaintiffs entered into the 
Purchase Agreement on July 28, 1979, that they paid $3,480 as a 
down payment on the Property, that they made monthly payments of 
$141.50 each month beginning on August 20, 1979, and that Froerer 
Corp. did not receive an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' contract 
receivable until June 1980. Thus, Ranch Liquidators received at 
least $4,895 of the purchase price of the Property ($3,480 down 
payment and ten monthly payments of $141.50). 
Rescission is an equitable remedy that abrogates the 
contract and restores the parties to their original positions. 
McEnroe v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595, 598 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1984) . It precludes recovery of damages for breach of the 
contract. Whitelev v. O'Dell. 219 Kan. 314, 548 P.2d 798, 802 
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(1976)• In an action for rescission, a party is only liable for 
the consideration or benefits received under the contract. McGraw 
v. Avlina fin re Bell & Beckwith), 54 Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1985). Thus, if the plaintiffs are entitled to rescission, 
the defendants are only liable for the amounts they actually 
received under the contract. The undisputed facts showed that 
Froerer Corp. did not receive all of the plaintiffs' payments under 
the Purchase Agreement. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
granting plaintiffs judgment against the defendants for the full 
amount of the plaintiffs7 claim, and, if this matter is otherwise 
affirmed, the action should be sent back to the trial court to 
determine the correct amount of damages that the plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover from the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the defendants did not assume Ranch Liquidators' 
obligations and liabilities under the Purchase Agreement, they 
cannot be liable for Ranch Liquidators' failure to deliver clear 
title to the plaintiffs. Moreover, because Froerer Corp. did not 
accept a warranty deed from Ranch Liquidators with the intention 
of taking title to the Property, the defendants have no obligation 
to convey the Property to the plaintiffs. In any event, Froerer 
Corp.'s intention in taking a warranty deed from Ranch Liquidators 
was a material question of fact that precluded summary judgment. 
Similarly, the plaintiffs7 intention in recording their quitclaim 
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deed from Froerer Corp. also raised factual questions precluding 
summary judgment* 
The trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs rescis-
sion of the Purchase Agreement because Ranch Liquidators, the other 
party to the Agreement, was not a party to this action and because 
the defendants could not be returned to their status quo- Finally, 
the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs a judgment for 
the full amount of their claim since the undisputed facts showed 
that the defendants did not receive all of the plaintiffs' payments 
under the Purchase Agreement. 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants respectfully 
request that the court reverse the summary judgment granted to 
the plaintiffs and remand this action for further proceedings. 
DATED this 'S' day of November, 1989. 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56* Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facta so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 3tated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of dH papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depqsitions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
